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REGULATING ROOMMATE RELATIONS:
PROTECTION OR ATTACK AGAINST NEW
YORK CITY’S TENANTS?
Laurel R. Dick*
INTRODUCTION
On December 20, 2000, the New York State Division of
Housing and Community Renewal (“DHCR”) promulgated an
amendment to the Rent Stabilization Code (“the code”) that
governs all rent stabilized housing in New York City.1 This
amendment, section 2525.7 of the code, took on a task that was
novel to rent regulation in New York, the regulation of roommate
relations.2 It prohibits tenants from charging their roommates
more than a “proportionate” share of the rent under any
circumstance.3 An analysis of the statutory history demonstrates
that this provision’s novelty is not creative innovation, but rather
an unauthorized interference with the protected tenant-roommate

* Brooklyn Law School Class of 2003; B.A., Grinnell College, 1997.
The author would like to thank Professor George Johnson, David Robinson,
and especially Edward Josephson. She would also like to thank Greg for his
patience and support.
1
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 2525.7 (2001) (recording
effective date as Dec. 20, 2000 in “Historical Note”). See also Hutchins v.
Conciliation and Appeals Bd., 480 N.Y.S.2d 684 (Sup. Ct. 1984) (finding that
Rent Stabilization Law and Code are binding authority in regards to New York
City rent stabilized units).
2
§ 2525.7.
3
Id.
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relationship.4
While an examination of the current state of the rental market
shows that protection of roommates is warranted, interference is
not necessarily protection. Interference with the tenant-roommate
relationship can only be justified if the regulation puts the remedy
in the hands of the proper party—the roommate—and limits its
effects to real, unjustified profiteering by tenants at the expense
of their roommates.5 Section 2525.7 (“the proportionality
provision”) has done neither of these things, but has instead
created the potential for large-scale eviction of tenants and the
simultaneous eviction of their roommates.6
Part I of this note describes the regulatory context in which
the proportionality provision was promulgated including relevant
New York statutes, codes and caselaw. Part II explains the two
main flaws in the design of the provision as a roommate
protection. Finally, Part III demonstrates that protection of
roommates against gross overcharge is justified only if it is done
in a way that actually protects the roommate and does not
infringe unnecessarily on the rights of the primary tenants. Part
III also includes proposals for designing a roommate protection
provision that is successful to those ends—a difficult but
workable task.
I. BACKGROUND
In 1983, DHCR was given authority by the New York State
Legislature to administer the Rent Stabilization Law in New York
City through the code.7 In promulgating the proportionality
provision, DHCR made a significant departure from the usual
approach to the tenant-roommate relationship taken by the state
legislature through the Rent Stabilization Law, and by the courts

4

See N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 235-f (McKinney 2001). See infra note 24
(explaining how DHCR’s promulgation lacked authority).
5
See infra Part II.A-B.
6
See infra Part II.A-B.
7
Omnibus Housing Act, 1983 N.Y. Laws 403, § 3.
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in their decisions.8 Section 2525.7 of the Rent Stabilization Code
states:
The rental amount that a tenant may charge a person in
occupancy pursuant to section 235-f of the Real Property
Law shall not exceed such occupant’s proportionate share
of the legal regulated rent charged to and paid by the
tenant for the subject housing accommodation. For the
purposes of this subdivision, an occupant’s share shall be
determined by dividing the legal regulated rent by the
total number of tenants named on the lease and the total
number of occupants residing in the subject housing
accommodation. However, the total number of tenants
named on the lease shall not include a tenant’s spouse,
and the total number of occupants shall not include a
tenant’s family member or an occupant’s dependent child.
Regardless of the number of occupants, tenants named on
the lease shall remain responsible for payment to the
owner of the entire legal regulated rent. The charging of a
rental amount to an occupant that exceeds that occupant’s
proportionate share shall be deemed to constitute a
violation of this Code.9
The New York State Legislature last expressed its stance on
the tenant-roommate relationship in 1983 with the enactment of
the Omnibus Housing Act, which amended several statutes
governing rental housing.10 In its legislative findings it stated that
in order to protect those households in which unrelated
roommates live together “for reasons of economy, safety and
companionship,” it had become necessary to declare a tenant’s
right to have a roommate.11 Based on this finding of necessity,
8

See infra Part I (detailing the history of New York City’s treatment of
the tenant-roommate relationship).
9
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 2525.7(b) (2001). Section (a)
reads, “Housing accommodations subject to the RSL and this Code may be
occupied in accordance with the provisions and subject to the limitations of
section 235-f of the Real Property Law.” Id. § 2525.7(a).
10
Omnibus Housing Act, 1983 N.Y. Laws 403.
11
Id. § 1 (stating “that unless corrective action is taken by the legislature,
thousands of households throughout this state composed of unrelated persons
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the legislature enacted section 235-f of the Real Property Law
which states in part:
2. It shall be unlawful for a landlord to restrict occupancy
of residential premises, by express lease terms or
otherwise, to a tenant or tenants or to such tenants and
immediate family. Any such restriction in a lease or rental
agreement entered into or renewed before or after the
effective date of this section shall be unenforceable as
against public policy.
3. Any lease or rental agreement for residential premises
entered into by one tenant shall be construed to permit
occupancy by the tenant, immediate family of the tenant,
one additional occupant, and dependent children of the
occupant provided that the tenant or the tenant’s spouse
occupies the premises as his primary residence.12
This provision was intended to overrule a court of appeals
decision in which the court found that a lease restricting
occupancy to the tenant and her immediate family did not violate
the State Human Rights Law or New York City Human Rights
Law, which prohibit discrimination on the basis of marital
status.13
who live together for reasons of economy, safety and companionship may be
placed in jeopardy”).
12
N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 235-f (McKinney 2001).
13
Hudson View Prop. v. Weiss, 450 N.E.2d 234, 235 (N.Y. 1983)
(reasoning that the landlord had “not discriminated against the tenant in
violation of [s]tate or city Human Rights Law” because the eviction was
triggered “not because the tenant is unmarried, but because the lease restricts
occupancy of her apartment, as are all apartments in the building, to the tenant
and the tenant’s immediate family”).
See Omnibus Housing Act (Memorandum of Senator John B. Daly), 1983
N.Y. Laws 403. See also id. § 1 (declaring “that recent judicial decisions
refusing to extend the protection of the human rights laws to unrelated persons
sharing a dwelling place will exacerbate this serious problem”). These
memoranda refer to Hudson View Properties, 450 N.E.2d 234, which cited
both the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296-5(a)
(McKinney 2001), cited in Hudson View Prop., 450 N.E.2d at 235, and the
New York City Human Rights Law, Administrative Code of City of New
York § B1-7.0-5(a), cited in Hudson View Prop., 450 N.E.2d at 235.
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At the same time, the legislature enacted separate findings
and prohibitions with regard to a tenant subletting to another
person during her absence from the premises.14 Finding that
“speculative and profiteering practices on the part of certain
holders of apartment leases [were] leaving many subtenants
without protection and removing many housing accommodations
from the normal open market,”15 the legislature included in the
Omnibus Housing Act an amendment to the Rent Stabilization
Law regulating subletting.16 This amendment limited the amount
of time a tenant could sublet a regulated apartment in New York
City to a period of two years and the rent at which a tenant could
sublet to the amount charged by the landlord plus 10% for
furnishings.17 Examining these two provisions clearly shows that
the legislature treated the acts of taking in roommates and
subletting differently.
Since the changes were enacted, the courts have reinforced
the distinctions laid out in the law between subletting and taking
in roommates. In 520 East 81st St. Associates v. RoughtonHester, the appellate division held that, in contrast to
overcharging a sublettor, overcharging a roommate was not a
proper cause for eviction and dismissed a petition for eviction on
those grounds.18 The court pointed to the legislature’s clear intent
14

Omnibus Housing Act, 1983 N.Y. Laws 403.
Id. § 1.
16
N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 26-511(c)(12) (McKinney 2001).
17
Id. The amendment states that the regulation:
[P]ermits subletting of units subject to this law pursuant to section
two hundred twenty-six-b of the real property law provided that (a)
the rental charged to the subtenant does not exceed the stabilized rent
plus a ten percent surcharge payable to the tenant if the unit sublet
was furnished with the tenant’s furniture; (b) the tenant can establish
that at all times he or she has maintained the unit as his or her
primary residence and intends to occupy it as such at the expiration of
the sublease . . . (f) the tenant may not sublet the unit for more than a
total of two years, including the term of the proposed sublease, out of
the four-year period preceding the termination date of the proposed
sublease.
15

Id.
18

520 East 81st St. Assocs. v. Roughton-Hester, 555 N.Y.S.2d 70, 73
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to differentiate a sublease from a tenant-roommate arrangement
when regulating tenants’ actions.19 It also reasoned that, “many
‘roommates’ are not strangers but individuals who choose to live
together, apportioning costs according to their respective
financial abilities, and other considerations.”20 The court in
Roughton-Hester also based its decision on the fact that there was
no law explicitly governing the rent a tenant charges her
roommate.21
The reasoning behind Roughton-Hester holds strong today.
While DHCR has promulgated the proportionality provision since
Roughton-Hester was decided in 1990, it is only a regulatory
provision.22 In fact, there is still no legislatively enacted law
governing rent between tenants and roommates in New York
City.23 As a result, tenants and tenant organizations have argued
convincingly that DHCR had no legislative grounding when it
passed the proportionality provision and that it overstepped its
authority.24
(App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1990) (holding that “neither the lease nor any law
governing rent stabilized apartments permit a landlord to evict a tenant for
earning a profit from the rent charged a roommate”); see also Handwerker v.
Ensley, 690 N.Y.S.2d 54 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1999) (denying injunction
against a nonpayment proceeding when the roommate had requested the
injunction on the theory that he was being overcharged).
19
Roughton-Hester, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 72 (stating that “[t]he Legislature
enacted separate provisions pertaining to subtenants and roommates and
specifically indicated its intention to eliminate profiteering in subleases while
remaining silent as to such practices committed by a tenant vis-a-vis a
roommate”).
20
Id. at 73.
21
Id. at 72.
22
RAM 1 LLC v. Mazzola, N.Y.L.J., June 8, 2001, at 21:1 (Civ. Ct.),
aff’d & remanded, No. 01-294, 2001 WL 1682829 (Sup. App. Term. 1st
Dep’t Dec. 28, 2001). The court in RAM 1 LLC v. Mazzola cites the existence
of a new proportionality provision as its reason for distinguishing RoughtonHester. Id.
23
See supra notes 10-17 and accompanying text (recounting the history of
lawmaking around roommates and sublettors).
24
See, e.g., Petitioners-Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Support of
Petition at 19-21, Brooklyn Hous. & Family Serv. v. N.Y. State Div. of
Hous. and Cmty. Renewal, No. 14191/01 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings County
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The “Findings and Declaration of Emergency” introducing
New York City’s Rent Stabilization Law states that one of this
law’s purposes is “to forestall profiteering, speculation, and other
disruptive practices tending to produce threats to the public
health.”25 When enacting the limitations on subletting covered
under the Omnibus Housing Act of 1983, the legislature
reaffirmed its goal of protecting all tenants against profiteering
by expressing this intent in its legislative findings,26 and by
providing subtenants with the remedy of treble damages against
an overcharging tenant.27 Moreover, when a tenant overcharges
her subtenants and the landlord has constructive knowledge that
the tenant holds only an “illusory tenancy”28 because she has
2001). One consortium of tenants and tenant advocates challenging this and
other provisions promulgated by DHCR argue that DHCR was given a limited
grant of authority by the legislature, citing Rent Stabilization Law section 26511(c) as stating, “A code shall not be adopted hereunder unless it appears to
the division of housing and community renewal that such code (1) provides
safeguards against unreasonably high rent increases and, in general, protects
tenants and the public interest.” N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 26-511(c)
(McKinney 2001). Citing such cases as Matter of Jones v. Berman, 332
N.E.2d 303 (N.Y. 1976), and Trump-Equitable Fifth Ave. Co. v. Gliedman,
443 N.E.2d 940 (N.Y. 1982), they assert that the New York Court of Appeals
holds that promulgations beyond the authority of an agency are invalid.
Petitioners-Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Petition at 19-21.
See also Appellant’s Opening Brief at 9-11, RAM 1 LLC v. Mazzola, No. 01294, 2001 WL 1682829 (Sup. App. Term. 1st Dep’t Dec. 28, 2001) (No.
72479/01). These arguments are supported by the well-established ultra vires
doctrine, summarized as follows:
[T]he basic doctrine of administrative law . . . is the doctrine of ultra
vires. The jurisdictional principle is the root principle of
administrative power. The statute is the source of agency authority as
well as of its limits. If an agency act is within the statutory limits (or
vires), its action is valid; if it is outside them (or ultra vires), it is
invalid. No statute is needed to establish this; it is inherent in the
constitutional positions of agencies and courts.
BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 171 (3d ed. 1991).
25
N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 26-501 (McKinney 2001).
26
See supra text accompanying note 15 (quoting the legislative findings).
27
§ 26-511(c)(12).
28
Primrose v. Donahoe, 676 N.Y.S.2d 585, 587 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t
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been absent from the premises for more than two years, the
courts have crafted their decisions to protect the subtenant.29
They have found that the subtenant has the right to the tenancy.30
The proportionality provision, on the other hand, contains no
such remedy that evinces the purpose of protecting roommates
against profiteering.31 The language of the provision is entirely
silent as to the remedy for a roommate overcharge.32
Even without looking at the underlying Rent Stabilization
Law, the code itself does not allow for eviction under its new
proportionality provision. The code states that, “[a]s long as the
tenant continues to pay the rent to which the owner is entitled, no
tenant shall be denied a renewal lease or removed from any
housing accommodation . . . except on one or more grounds
specified in this Code.”33 Unless prior approval of DHCR has
been obtained, an action to recover possession of a rent-stabilized
unit based on wrongful acts of the tenant may only be
commenced based on one of the grounds listed in section 2524.3
of the code.34 Roommate overcharge is not listed as one of the
1998) (defining an “illusory tenancy” as one where “the rent laws have been
violated in a way that has permitted the prime tenant to ‘rent . . . [the
apartment] for the purpose of subleasing for profit or otherwise depriving the
subtenant of rights under the Rent Stabilization Law’” (quoting Avon
Furniture Leasing v. Popolizio, 500 N.Y.S.2d 1019, 1022 (App. Div. 1st
Dep’t 1986))).
29
Id. (defeating a holdover proceeding against the sublettors and reassigning the tenancy to them after the primary illusory tenants had moved
out).
30
Id. See also Skeeter v. Clark, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 23, 2001, at 20:3 (Civ.
Ct.) (defeating a holdover proceeding against the sublettor and re-assigning the
tenancy to her despite lacking the landlord’s permission to succeed to the
tenancy).
31
See supra note 9 and accompanying text (quoting the language of the
proportionality provision).
32
See supra note 9 and accompanying text (quoting the language of the
proportionality provision).
33
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 2524.1(a) (2001), cited in
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 1-2, Kips Bay
LLC v. Feinberg, No. 96915/01 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 2001).
34
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 2524.3 (2001). These grounds
include failure to cure a substantial violation of the lease, creation of a
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grounds for eviction.35 In fact, DHCR’s own general counsel
stated that the provision was never meant to provide a new cause
for eviction.36 Thus, the code mandates that the proportionality
provision cannot serve as grounds for eviction.
Nevertheless, the fact that the language of the provision does
not specify a remedy has led to confusion. The first and only case
decided under this new provision, RAM I LLC v. Mazzola, read
the remedy of eviction of the entire household into the
proportionality provision.37 This case concerned an eviction
action brought by a landlord against a tenant who charged her
roommate almost $300 per month above the rent for the entire
apartment for the rental of one bedroom.38 In this decision, Judge
Schachner denied a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause
of action reasoning that the proportionality provision provides a
cause for eviction when a tenant charges her roommate more than
her proportionate share of the rent.39 The court distinguished
nuisance in the building, substantial damage to the building, harassment of the
landlord or other tenants, use of the unit for illegal activities, refusal to allow
the landlord necessary access, refusal to renew an expired lease, and violation
of the limits on subletting. Id.
35
Id. It should be noted that a tenant earning money from her apartment
is not in substantial breach of her lease. In order for business use to be a
substantial breach of a residential lease, and therefore grounds for eviction
under § 2524.3, the use “must materially affect the character of the building,
materially damage or burden the property or materially disturb the other
tenants.” Haberman v. Gotbaum, 698 N.Y.S.2d 406, 410 (Civ. Ct. 1999).
Activities that have been allowed under this standard include a private art
studio, Haberman, 698 N.Y.S.2d 406, a private office, Nissen v. Wang, 431
N.Y.S.2d 984 (Civ. Ct. 1980), and a family childcare facility, Sorkin v.
Cross, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 24, 1996, at 27:3 (Civ. Ct.).
36
Live at Five (WNBC-TV broadcast June 5, 2001). See also Affidavit of
Marcia Hirsch, DHCR General Counsel, In Support of Response at ¶ 282,
Brooklyn Hous. & Family Services v. N.Y. State Div. of Hous. and Cmty.
Renewal, No. 14191/01 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings County 2001) (stating that
“DHCR’s interpretation of § 2525.7 is that it vests roommates with the right
to file a complaint against the tenant rather than create a new cause of action
for eviction”) [hereinafter Hirsch Affidavit].
37
Mazzola, No. 01-294, 2001 WL 1682829, at *1.
38
Id.
39
Mazzola, N.Y.L.J., June 8, 2001, at 21:1, aff’d & remanded, No. 01-
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Roughton-Hester on the grounds that the proportionality
provision was not in existence at the time of that decision.40 The
petition upheld by the court read, in part, that “[t]he serious
nature of this violation, charging a roommate a monthly sum in
excess of the entire monthly rent for the whole apartment,
constitutes illegal profiteering and as such, does not lend itself to,
nor is it susceptible of cure.”41 While the succinctness of the
housing court’s decision obscures its reasoning to some extent,
the court appears to have accepted this landlord’s characterization
of Ms. Mazzola’s actions as “profiteering” to not only find a
cause for eviction that is not explicitly provided in the provision,
but also to find that cause for eviction incurable.42
II. THE PROPORTIONALITY PROVISION’S FAILURES
The main flaws in the proportionality provision as it now
stands, and as it has been applied, are twofold. First, it places the
remedy in the wrong hands.43 Rather than giving the roommate a
294, 2001 WL 1682829 (holding that “[g]iven the language of Section
2525.7(b) of the Rent Stabilization Code, . . . respondent’s motion to dismiss
the petition is denied”).
40
Id. (stating erroneously, “Roughton-Hester even mentions that at the
time there was no law governing rent stabilized tenants which dealt with the
issue of a tenant who earns a profit from a roommate. With the recent
amendment this is no longer true”).
41
Appellant’s Opening Brief at 8, RAM 1 LLC v. Mazzola, No. 01-294,
2001 WL 1682829 (Sup. App. Term. 1st Dep’t Dec. 28, 2001) (No.
72479/01) (quoting Petitioner’s opening brief).
42
Mazzola, N.Y.L.J., June 8, 2001, at 21:1, aff’d & remanded, No. 01294, 2001 WL 1682829, at *1. See also Jay Romano, Your Home: Roommate
Overcharges Risk Lease, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2002, § 11, at 5.
DHCR has responded to this decision by taking a step back, see quotation
by Marcia Hirsch, supra note 36, but qualified its denunciation of the decision
so that its stance is somewhat unclear: “[h]owever, it should be noted that
Ram I LLC presents the kind of egregious situation where the roommate paid
not only more than her proportionate share but more than the tenant was
paying.” Hirsch Affidavit, supra note 36, at ¶ 282.
43
See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, §§ 2522.1, 2526.1
(2001) (giving overcharged tenants a right to reimbursement with interest from
their landlords); N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 26-511(c)(12) (McKinney 2001)
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claim for reimbursement against the primary tenant, it gives the
landlord a cause for eviction of the entire unit, including the
roommate.44 Second, it provides no exemptions for justified
disproportionalities.45 Given the current housing market, lowincome tenants are justified in charging their roommates greater
than proportionate rents when needed in order to sustain their
tenancies.46 An examination of four major schools of thought on
the justifications behind rent regulation enlightens this analysis:
the redistribution of wealth, the preservation of stable
communities, the protection of the “personhood” interest that a
tenant holds in her home, and the maintenance of a fair market
free from speculation and profiteering.47 An application of these
theories to the problem of roommate relations reaffirms the ways
in which the proportionality provision is flawed in its design and
recent interpretation.
A. The Remedy Must Not Lie with the Landlord
By construing the proportionality provision as providing a
just cause for eviction, the Mazzola court gave the remedy for an
overcharge to the wrong party.48 Under Mazzola, landlords stand
to profit from the discovery of a roommate overcharge, while
(giving overcharged subtenants a right to treble damages from their primary
tenants).
44
Mazzola, No. 01-294, 2001 WL 1682829. But see supra note 36
(quoting DHCR as denying intent to be used as a cause for eviction).
45
See infra Part II.B.
46
See infra Part II.B.1 (describing the current economic straits of New
York City tenants in relation to rent levels).
47
See Margaret Jane Radin, Residential Rent Control, in PERSPECTIVES
ON PROPERTY LAW 410 (Robert C. Ellison et al. eds., 2d ed. 1995)
(summarizing and comparing the first three justifications); Timothy L.
Collins, “Fair Rents” or “Forced Subsidies” Under Rent Regulation: Finding
a Regulatory Taking Where Legal Fictions Collide, 59 ALB. L. REV. 1293
(1996) (summarizing the fair market objective). See infra Part II.A (discussing
the relevance of the redistribution of wealth and community preservation
theories to the proportionality provision); Part II.B (discussing the relevance
of the fair market objective and personhood interest theories).
48
Mazzola, No. 01-294, 2001 WL 1682829.
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roommates are given no remedy and ultimately face eviction
themselves upon the discovery of their “disproportionate” rent
burden.49 Because this provision only benefits landlords at the
expense of tenants and their roommates, the proportionality
provision cannot find its justification in statutory enactments
intended to protect tenants from profiteering.50
The sentiment voiced by the court in Mazzola, that a tenant
who overcharges a roommate wrongly profiteers off of her
landlord’s assets, is one that is echoed by the media.51 The
Mazzola court’s recognition of a cause for eviction in roommate
overcharging received significant media attention—presented to
the public both as the justifiable curtailment of a tenant’s “profit
center”52 and, in contrast, as the opportunism of a landlord at the
expense of a disabled old lady.53 One article reported that the
tenant, Ms. Mazzola, owned a second house in Westport
Connecticut worth $490,000 to $640,000 that was yielding
$33,000 per year in rental income.54 At the same time, the article
stated, the landlord was deprived of the $10,000 monthly market

49

Id. The bias in this placement of the remedy is particularly transparent
given that the penalty that a landlord faces for overcharging a tenant is mere
reimbursement of the tenant with interest. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit.
9, § 2526.1 (2001).
50
See supra note 25 and accompanying text (quoting the purposes of the
Rent Stabilization Law). Clearly, § 235-f of the Real Property Law also fails
to provide the justification needed by DHCR to restrict a tenant’s right to take
in roommates upon penalty of immediate eviction. The court of appeals has
emphatically affirmed that “it is undeniable that this section was passed to
protect tenants and occupants, not landlords.” Capital Holding Co. v.
Stravrolakes, 662 N.Y.S.2d 14, 15-16 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1997), aff’d, 707
N.E.2d 432 (N.Y. 1998) (holding that § 235-f does not create a cause for
eviction in the taking in of more than one unrelated roommate), cited in
Petitioners-Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law, supra note 24, at 56.
51
See, e.g., John Tierney, A Room and a View (Libertarian), N.Y.
TIMES, June 12, 2001, at B1 (asking, “Does Joan E. Mazzola deserve to join
the list of New York’s 10 Worst Tenants?”).
52
Id.
53
Bruce Lambert, Rule Limits Overcharging of Roommates, N.Y. TIMES,
June 5, 2001, at B1.
54
Tierney, supra note 51, at B1.
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rent potential of this Park Avenue apartment because Ms.
Mazzola was paying the stabilized rent of $1,847.77 per month.55
This argument, that tenants who are not properly using their
tenancies wrongly deprive landlords of the market rent for those
years of tenancy, can be seen in other contexts as well.56 In
Mazzola, this sentiment motivated the form that the remedy
took—eviction.57 However, placing the remedy for roommate
overcharge in the hands of the landlord is neither justified,
because it is the roommate whom the provision seeks to protect,
nor wise, given the repercussions.58
55

Id. But see infra notes 90-92 and accompanying text (presenting
mitigating facts and conflicting stories as to Ms. Mazzola’s resources and
roommate arrangement).
56
See, e.g., John Chipman, Bogus NYC Tenant Sued for $5M: Lived 30
Years in Flat Leased to Friend at Bargain Rate, NAT’L POST, Aug. 24, 2001,
at A11. The story tells of a landlord who recently sued a tenant who had been
living under the leaseholder’s name for more than thirty-five years. His claim
for $5 million, the difference between the tenant’s rent and lucrative market
rents in the neighborhood, has not yet been decided. Id. Despite the fact that
the occupant had not been trying to hide his identity, paying rent directly to
the landlord, the judge saw the tenant as exploitive: “[he] has received a
largesse for an extremely long time by paying an artificially low rent in a
highly desirable neighborhood.” Id.
57
Mazzola, No. 01-294, 2001 WL 1682829, at *1.
58
A quick analysis of the government takings doctrine demonstrates that
the placement of the remedy in the hands of the roommate rather than the
landlord constitutes neither a physical taking nor a regulatory taking in the
context of the New York City housing market. U.S. CONST. amend. V,
amend. XIV.
In Yee v. City of Escondido, the Supreme Court found that a per se
physical taking was not made when city regulations over mobile home parks
placed limits on rents, required good cause for eviction, and allowed renters of
mobile home sites (or “pods”) to sell their homes and transfer their tenancies
to another person. Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 524-25 (1992).
The Court found that the determining fact was that the mobile home park
owners had “voluntarily rented their land to mobile home owners.” Id. at 527.
Likewise, New York City rent stabilized landlords enter the business
voluntarily and, like in Yee, have a regulatory means of leaving the business.
Id. at 527-28; N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 2524.5(a)(1) (2001).
The fact that the ordinance in Yee allowed a transfer of wealth from park
owners to their mobile home tenants, through the sales premium which mobile
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home owners stood to receive by selling their right to a regulated tenancy, did
not make for a physical taking. Yee, 503 U.S. at 529-30. This is suggestive of
the argument that to allow tenants to overcharge their roommates constitutes a
per se taking by transferring profits. That argument is clearly defeated by Yee.
The Yee Court, however, did not decide whether such regulation constituted a
regulatory taking. Id. at 538.
Regulation of private property constitutes a violation of the Fifth
Amendment takings clause through the Fourteenth Amendment as a regulatory
taking “if it denies an owner economically viable use of the property (a per se
regulatory taking), or if it does not substantially advance legitimate State
interests.” Rent Stabilization Assoc. of New York City v. Higgins, 630
N.E.2d 626, 83 N.Y.2d 156, 173 (1993). Landlords’ profits are in no way
extinguished by rent stabilization in New York City. According to a Rent
Guidelines Board report, the New York City agency that annually sets
maximum stabilized rent increases, the average rent-stabilized landlord made a
net income (excluding income tax and debt service) of $177,000 per building
in 1999. RENT GUIDELINES BOARD, 2001 INCOME AND EXPENSE STUDy 8,
available at http://www.housingnyc.com (Apr. 10, 2001).
The courts have found that a regulation advances a legitimate state
interest, except in situations where they cannot find a close causal nexus
between the property being regulated and the stated purposes of the regulation.
See, e.g., Seawall Assocs. v. City of New York, 542 N.E.2d 1059 (N.Y.
1989) (finding that a city ordinance requiring residential hotel owners to
renovate and rent out their units at regulated rates rather than to demolish or
convert them was not closely related to the purpose of alleviating
homelessness, because the rooms would not be limited to formerly homeless
or potentially homeless individuals), cited in Collins, supra note 47, at 1297.
As explained below, one of the principal purposes of the New York City rent
regulation system is to protect tenants against an unfair housing market of
scarcity and unnaturally high rents. As Justice Antonin Scalia pointed out in
Pennell v. City of San Jose, “When commodities have been priced at a level
that produces exorbitant returns, the owners of those commodities can be
viewed as responsible for the economic hardship that occurs.” Pennell v. City
of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 20 (1988) (concurring in part, dissenting in part)
(arguing, however, that the rent ordinance clause at issue was an
unconstitutional taking because any exorbitant returns would be curtailed by
other parts of the ordinance), cited in Collins, supra note 47, at 1304. Thus,
the fair market objective constitutes the necessary causal nexus between the
protection of tenants and the regulation of landlords. Id., cited in Collins,
supra note 47, at 1304. This same reasoning supports giving the remedy for a
roommate overcharge to the roommate rather than the landlord. As argued in
greater detail below, because current rent levels are governed more by scarcity
and market forces than by regulation, allowing tenants to charge their

DICKMACRO4-29.DOC

REGULATING ROOMMATE RELATIONS

7/16/02 2:28 PM

553

Because of the multitude of shared living situations among
rent stabilized tenants, landlords may have great latitude in
choosing who to evict under the proportionality provision, and
can do so based on what they stand to gain from the eviction.59 In
fact, landlords stand to gain a considerable sum due to the
recently enacted vacancy allowance of 20%.60 They can bring an
eviction under the proportionality provision even when a
roommate is satisfied with her rental arrangement.61
Many disproportionate roommate arrangements are voluntary
and negotiated in the context of a personal relationship.62 For this
reason, unmarried couples, particularly gay and lesbian couples,
will be disparately impacted by the proportionality provision.63
Like married couples, many unmarried couples divide rent and

roommates “disproportionate” rents in some circumstances must be allowed in
order to protect tenants from those market forces. See infra Part II.B.1.
59
See Lambert, supra note 53, at B1. As many as 15.8% of rent
stabilized tenants have roommates. One source cites 8.3% of rent stabilized
tenants according to the 2000 Census, equaling approximately 83,000.
Affidavit of John Seley in Support of Petition, Brooklyn Hous. & Family
Services v. N.Y. State Div. of Hous. and Cmty. Renewal, No. 14191/01
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings County 2001). Another source cites 158,238 rentstabilized tenants in 1999, Lambert, supra note 53, at B1, which would seem
to equal approximately 15.8% of the group.
60
N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 26-511(c)(5-a) (McKinney 2001). For twoyear leases after a vacancy, a landlord can increase the monthly rent by 20%.
The formula is a little more complicated for one-year leases that follow a
vacancy. Id. The fact that a 20% increase above a low-rent unit may not be
considerable is made up for by two additional allowances. First, a landlord
who had a long-term tenant and was unable to collect a vacancy allowance
within the last eight years is allowed upon termination of that tenancy to
collect a 0.6% increase for each year since the last vacancy allowance. Id.
Second, upon the vacancy of a unit that was renting for $300 to $500 per
month, the landlord can increase the rent by $100. Id.
61
See supra note 9 and accompanying text (quoting statutory language).
62
See supra note 20 and accompanying text (quoting the Roughton-Hester
court’s finding on the personal nature of roommate arrangements).
63
See Memorandum of Law of Amicus Curiae LAMBDA Legal Defense
and Education Fund, Inc. in Support of Petitioners-Plaintiffs, Brooklyn Hous.
& Family Services v. N.Y. State Div. of Hous. and Cmty. Renewal, No.
14191/01 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings County 2001) [hereinafter LAMBDA Memo].
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other living expenses according to who is best able to pay them,
or for other personal reasons.64 Unlike married couples,
however, unmarried couples who live in apartments where only
one partner’s name is on the lease, and where the unnamed
partner pays the greater portion of the rent, will have the burden
of proving that they are family if they are to defend against an
eviction action alleging a violation of the proportionality
provision.65 That burden is likely to be a significant one,
requiring the help of a lawyer and disclosure of intimate details
of the couple’s relationship.66
Giving landlords the benefit of a roommate overcharge action
64

Id. at 5-6.
See N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 235-f(1)(b) (McKinney 2001) (defining
an “occupant,” as referred to in the proportionality provision, as “a person,
other than a tenant or a member of a tenant’s immediate family, occupying a
premises with the consent of the tenant or tenants”), cited in LAMBDA
Memo, supra note 63, at 5.
66
LAMBDA Memo, supra note 63, at 6-11. The legislature has
constructed a definition of family in relation to succession rights that was
meant to incorporate same-sex couples. Rent Regulation Reform Act, 1997
N.Y. Laws 116, § 21; N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 2520.6(o)(2)
(2001). The new definition of family calls for an examination of “emotional
and financial commitment” evidenced by such factors as longevity of the
relationship, sharing of expenses, intermingling of finances, jointly attending
family functions and celebrations, formalizing legal obligations, holding
themselves out to the public as family members, regularly performing family
functions, and other evidence evincing “the intention of creating a long-term,
emotionally-committed relationship.” Id. That definition has also been found
to apply to other contexts. LAMBDA Memo, supra note 63, at 6. However,
the burden of demonstrating that a relationship qualifies under this definition
can be overwhelming and intrusive. See, e.g., Classic Properties, L.P. v.
Martinez, 646 N.Y.S.2d 755, 755-56 (App. Term 1st Dep’t 1996), cited in
LAMBDA Memo, supra note 63, at 11 (offering photographs, intimate
correspondence, and affidavits as proof of a twenty-four year relationship);
Strassman v. Estate of Eggena, 582 N.Y.S.2d 899 (App. Term 1st Dep’t
1992), cited in LAMBDA Memo, supra note 63, at 11 (involving two-and-ahalf years of litigation). Statutory family status may be even harder to prove in
the context of the proportionality provision than in the context of succession
rights, because those couples defending against this sort of eviction are less
likely to be long-term couples with intermingling finances. LAMBDA Memo,
supra note 63, at 13.
65

DICKMACRO4-29.DOC

REGULATING ROOMMATE RELATIONS

7/16/02 2:28 PM

555

also gives them reason to harass their tenants and a tool by which
to do so.67 This harassment may cause a tenant tremendous stress,
and may cause her to move even without the process of an
eviction proceeding.68 Disproportionate rents are not always easy
to prove without the cooperation of the roommate.69 Because
tenants can conceal rent-sharing arrangements by paying with one
check, a landlord may have to use creative means of finding out a
roommate’s rent when attempting an eviction.70 Many of these
means may border on harassment. The New York Apartment Law
Insider, for example, advises landlords to hire a private
investigator and to collude with the roommate.71 One landlord
attempted to investigate by sending a letter that failed to allege
any evidence of disproportionate rent charges, but still demanded
that the tenant “account to this office for any and all sums
collected by you from roommates.”72 It is unclear whether the
Mazzola court’s interpretation of the proportionality provision
gives landlords the right to demand information on roommate
arrangements.73
Even without these practical infirmities, the theoretical
approaches to rent regulation would reject the placement of the
remedy in the hands of landlords. Proponents of the
67

See G. Samuel Zucker, Note, Insurance for Eviction Without Cause: A
Middle Path for Tenant Tenure Rights and a New Remedy, 28 URB. LAW.
113, 129 (1996).
68
Id.
69
See Court OKs Eviction of Tenant Who Overcharges Roommate, N.Y.
APARTMENT L. INSIDER, Aug. 2001, at 11 [hereinafter Court OKs Eviction]
(stating that “[i]t’s not always easy to find out whether a tenant is
overcharging a roommate”).
70
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 2525.7(b) (2001) (stating that
“[r]egardless of the number of occupants, tenants named on the lease shall
remain responsible for payment to the owner of the entire legal regulated
rent”).
71
Court OKs Eviction, supra note 69, at 11.
72
Exhibit A, Affidavit of Sara Jane Swanson in Support of Petition,
Brooklyn Hous. & Family Services v. N.Y. State Div. of Hous. and Cmty.
Renewal, No. 14191/01 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings County 2001).
73
See infra note 171 (discussing the repercussions of such an
interpretation).
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redistribution of wealth theory defend a tenant’s use of a
landlord’s assets to her own gain.74 If a housing market is subject
to high demand and low supply, landlords will make high
economic rents (rents above a rate of return that is considered
reasonable on an average investment).75 Under such
circumstances, rent control and stabilization will cause a transfer
of wealth from the landlord to the tenants without an
accompanying decrease in supply that comes from lowering rents
to below a reasonable rate of return.76 The current New York
City housing market provides high economic rents and, even
under rent stabilization, provides substantial profits.77 According
to this approach, because wealth should be more equally
apportioned and because most tenants are poorer than their
landlords, rent regulation is a justified means to that end.78

74

Radin, supra note 47, at 412 (attributing this standpoint to “‘pure’
welfare economists”).
75
Id.
76
Id. (positing that there is no “allocative inefficiency” when “landlords
have high economic rents, so that rent control causes a ‘mere’ wealth transfer
from landlords to tenants”).
77
INCOME AND EXPENSE STUDY, supra note 58, at 8. According to a
report by the Rent Guidelines Board, the New York City agency that annually
sets maximum stabilized rent increases, the average rent stabilized landlord
made a net income (excluding income tax and debt service) of $177,000 per
building in 1999. Id. “As operating costs have consumed less revenue in
recent years, inflation–adjusted [net operating income] in 1999 was nearly
18% more than the average found in 1989.” Id. See also OFFICE OF THE
PUBLIC ADVOCATE, RENT DESTABILIZATION STUDY II: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
FAIRNESS TO LANDLORDS OF RENT INCREASES GRANTED BY THE RENT
GUIDELINES BOARD FOR STABILIZED APARTMENTS 4, available at http://www.
housingnyc.com (May 18, 1997) [hereinafter RENT DESTABILIZATION STUDY].
78
For those people who do not believe that the landlord’s “search for
profits is no different from that of other providers of goods and services,” as
Irving Welferd believes, redistribution of wealth through the housing market
seems particularly appropriate. See Irving Welferd, Poor Tenants, Poor
Landlords, Poor Policy, in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY LAW 374, 374
(Robert C. Ellison et al. eds., 2d ed. 1995). Disbelief in such a sentiment may
be fueled, for example, by the recognition that rents are mostly returns on an
investment rather than earnings from work. See ROBERT L. HEILBRONER, THE
WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS 96, 188 (6th ed. 1992) (attributing this critique to
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Likewise, because the tenant is often the party in need of greater
wealth, the rent regulation scheme cannot justly be used to
prevent a tenant from “profiteering” off of the landlord’s assets
by renting out part of her apartment at a profit.79 Thus, regulation
of the tenant-roommate relationship must not focus on the
landlord’s welfare.
There are flaws with the wealth redistribution justification.80
Because New York City’s rent stabilization is available to all but
the wealthiest tenants, this redistribution is not directed at those
who need it most.81 Redistribution of wealth has not been the
primary impetus behind New York City’s rent regulation
scheme.82 A more sensible scheme, under this reasoning, would
give the lowest-income tenants the greatest benefits.83 Moreover,
arguably not all landlords are wealthy. Some struggle to get by
and are nevertheless subject to the same rent regulation scheme
as those landlords who are making significant profits.84
the economic philosophers David Ricardo and Henry George); INCOME AND
EXPENSE STUDY, supra note 58, at 2, 6 (reporting that out of the average unit
rent of $706, arguably only $220 goes to some sort of landlord “work”—i.e.,
labor, maintenance, and administration costs combined). It may also reflect a
sense of injustice that tenants feel when paying rents that, because of tax
favoritism for homeowners, are close to what those tenants would be paying in
mortgage payments were they able to place a down payment on a house.
Zucker, supra note 67, at 133.
79
See Radin, supra note 47, at 412 (explaining that proponents of wealth
redistribution are strictly concerned with the wealth transfer from landlords to
tenants).
80
See generally Collins, supra note 47 (arguing that viewing rent
regulation as a subsidy could make it vulnerable to challenge under the takings
doctrine).
81
Zucker, supra note 67, at 124.
82
See infra notes 119-26 and accompanying text (documenting evidence
of the fair rent objective throughout New York City’s rent regulation history).
83
See Zucker, supra note 67, at 124.
84
See, e.g., Welferd, supra note 78 (arguing that most landlords are
small-scale operators earning small incomes off of low-income tenants). The
New York City Rent Stabilization Code, however, allows for rent increases by
reason of a landlord’s economic hardship in certain circumstances, such as
when the landlord’s annual gross rents do not exceed her annual operating
costs by at least 5%. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 2522.4(c)
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However, another approach, the community preservation
theory, also confirms the error made by the Mazzola court in
assigning the remedy to the landlord.85 The community
preservation theory is based on the understanding that
communities have value beyond the mere conveniences that they
provide; communities play a strong part in shaping the identities
of their members.86 Thus, communities are valuable to society
and should be preserved.87 Using the community preservation
theory to inform a solution to roommate overcharge supports the
protection of both tenants and roommates. For example, a large
group of those tenants who charge their roommates more than a
“proportionate” share of the rent are likely to be senior citizens
who have often lived in their units and in their communities for
many years.88 On the other hand, roommates may also be longterm residents; even new roommates may more likely be
community members than new tenants because shared housing
opportunities are generally advertised locally and informally, if at
all.89 Thus, both parties need protection if the community is to be
(2001). See also N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 2522.4(b)(1)
(2001).
85
Radin, supra note 47, at 417-18.
86
Id.
87
Id. at 418 (stating that “[w]e suppose from our knowledge of life in this
society that the personal utility attributable to living in an established closeknit community is very high . . . [and] that personhood is fostered by living
within an established community of other persons”).
88
UNDER ONE ROOF: ISSUES AND INNOVATIONS IN SHARED HOUSING 11
(George C. Hemmens et al. eds., SUNY Series in Urban Public Policy 1996)
[hereinafter UNDER ONE ROOF].
89
See ZANY’S NEW YORK CITY APARTMENT SALES AND RENTAL GUIDE
314-15 (Courtney Andrialis and Janet Beard eds., 2001 ed.) [hereinafter
ZANY’S] (recommending word-of-mouth as the most effective means of
finding a compatible roommate). Moreover, a 1999 study in New York City
found that 42% of renters moving into low-rent apartments (renting for under
$600 per month) learned of the apartment by word-of-mouth. RENT
GUIDELINES BOARD, INCOME AND AFFORDABILITY BRIEF: HOW RECENT
MOVERS FIND APARTMENTS IN NEW YORK CITY 2, available at http://www.
housingnyc.com (Jan. 1999). While that study excluded roommate situations,
this economical method of advertising arguably would be used just as
frequently by tenants as by low-revenue landlords. Id.
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preserved. While it is not clear which party the community
preservation theory favors in the tenant-roommate relationship, it
is clear from this approach that eviction of the entire household
cannot be the proper remedy for a roommate overcharge.
B. Exemptions Must Be Made Where Justified
At the same time that one New York Times journalist
portrayed Ms. Mazzola and her fellow tenants as profiteers,
another reported conflicting facts and also brought to light the
mitigating circumstances behind her actions.90 The article
reported that Ms. Mazzola subsisted on only $12,000 per year
and suffered from emphysema and heart ailments.91 Moreover,
Ms. Mazzola provided her roommate with food, use of the
common rooms, and daily maid service.92
These contrasting media representations raise the question as
to whether those tenants charging disproportionate rents should
be differentiated based on their reasons for doing so—based on
whether they are capitalists or little old ladies struggling to get
by. Low-income tenants are more likely to be justified in
charging their roommates disproportionate rents for several
reasons. First, in today’s housing market low-income tenants
need to take in roommates in order to subsist.93 Second, low-

90

See, e.g., Lambert, supra note 53, at B1.
Id.
92
Live at Five (WNBC-TV broadcast June 5, 2001).
93
See Affidavit of Jacqueline Burger in Support of Petition, Brooklyn
Hous. & Family Services v. N.Y. State Div. of Hous. and Cmty. Renewal,
No. 14191/01 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings County 2001) [hereinafter Burger
Affidavit]. Burger states the following:
A number of my clients can only afford to remain in their apartments
by obtaining roommate [sic]. Among those clients is an elderly
Holocaust survivor whose only source of income is less than $800.00
per month from Social Security Retirement. Her rent is higher than
her income. The only way she has been able to remain in an
apartment she has occupied for over 30 years is by having a
roommate who pays more than 50 percent of the rent.
Id. at ¶ 7. See also Lambert, supra note 53, at B1.
91
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income tenants face greater repercussions as a result of eviction.94
Third, low-income tenants may be more likely to engage in
informal exchanges that equalize a roommate arrangement but are
not exempted by DHCR in its definition of “disproportionate”
rents.95 And, finally, low-income tenants have less access to legal
information and representation, and so are less capable of
avoiding a disproportionate arrangement and of defending against
an eviction on that basis.96 Therefore, a roommate overcharge
provision that fails to recognize justifications for overcharging is
unfair to those rent stabilized tenants who are the poorest.97
1. Economic Need
Because they cannot afford to pay even half of their monthly
rent, many low-income rent stabilized tenants must take in a
roommate at a disproportionate rent.98 Recent annual rentincrease allowances for rent stabilized apartments have outpaced
tenant household income increases.99 The New York City Rent
Guidelines Board reports, “When looking at both rent costs and
income, statistics indicate that it is increasingly difficult for those
94

See Ken Karas, Note, Recognizing a Right to Counsel for Indigent
Tenants in Eviction Proceedings in New York, 24 COLUM. J.L. & SOC.
PROBS. 527, 531 (1991) (stating that “[m]any tenants who are threatened with
eviction risk not only losing their current homes, but also dislocation from
their communities to the streets and shelters”).
95
See UNDER ONE ROOF, supra note 88, at 10-11.
96
See 144 Woodruff Corp. v. Lacrete, 585 N.Y.S.2d 956, 958 (Civ. Ct.
1992).
97
See generally Karas, supra note 94, at 527-32.
98
See Burger Affidavit, supra note 93; Lambert, supra note 53. See also
RENT GUIDELINES BOARD, 2001 INCOME AND AFFORDABILITY STUDY 4, 6,
available at http://www.housingnyc.com (Apr. 24, 2001) (reporting that
higher rates of overcrowding in rent stabilized units demonstrate that economic
need has forced rent stabilized tenants to take in roommates).
99
Zucker, supra note 67, at 154 n.31. In the 1990s, New York City rents
in general increased by 10.8% while tenants’ incomes rose by only 2.8%. In
the late 1990s, the real median household income for rent stabilized tenants
decreased 0.5%. J.A. Lobbia, The 8.7 Percent Solution, VILLAGE VOICE,
May 22, 2001, at 26.
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households with lower incomes to afford housing without some
government assistance.”100 In 1997, the New York Supreme
Court in Jiggetts v. Dowling found that the shelter allowance paid
to recipients under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(“AFDC”) program in New York City “[did] not bear a
reasonable relationship to the cost of housing in New York
City,” and ordered that it be increased.101 The court based this
finding on evidence of the scarcity of units renting within the
shelter allowance and the prevalence of AFDC recipients renting
at a level above their shelter allowance.102 Even though it has
been two years since the court’s order to issue new subsidies was
affirmed by the appellate division,103 the State Commissioner of
Social Services has yet to do so.104 Thus, while the shelter
allowance was unreasonable in 1987, when the Jiggetts suit was
initiated, it is even more unreasonable today at the same level of
$312 per month for a family of four.105
Despite little to no increase in real income for tenants over
the last decade, the Rent Guidelines Board has increased rents

100

INCOME AND AFFORDABILITY STUDY, supra note 98, at 4.
Jiggetts v. Dowling, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 22, 1997, at 26:2 (Sup. Ct.),
aff’d, 689 N.Y.S.2d 482 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1999). In response to a motion
to dismiss, this same court had found that New York State Social Services
Law § 350(1)(a) imposes a mandatory duty on the State Commissioner to set
adequate shelter allowances. Jiggetts v. Grinker, 528 N.Y.S.2d 462, 468
(Sup. Ct. 1988), rev’d, 543 N.Y.S.2d 414 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1989), rev’d,
553 N.E.2d 570 (N.Y. 1990), remanded to Jiggetts v. Dowling, N.Y.L.J.,
Apr. 22, 1997, at 26:2 (Sup. Ct.), aff’d, 689 N.Y.S.2d 482. The court also
granted a preliminary injunction, which is still in effect today, ordering that
AFDC recipients be paid rent arrears and future reasonable rents upon any
eviction action for non-payment caused by the inadequate shelter allowance in
order to prevent eviction. Id.
102
Jiggetts v. Dowling, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 22, 1997, at 26:2.
103
Jiggetts v. Dowling, 689 N.Y.S.2d 482.
104
Cerisse Anderson, Four Years After ‘Jiggetts,’ State Has Yet to Raise
Rent Allowance, N.Y.L.J., June 18, 2001, at 1:2.
105
Id. (noting also that 25,000 families are receiving court-ordered
enhanced interim shelter allowances in metropolitan New York in order to
avoid eviction, which demonstrates that the shelter allowance level is not
adequate).
101
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steadily each year.106 The board’s annual decision is based
principally on the price of goods and services that landlords
purchase, often exaggerated by temporary spikes in fuel prices,
inaccurate quotes by vendors, and embellished figures reported
by the landlords themselves.107 In recent years, the Rent
Guidelines Board has routinely granted landlords rent increases
higher than the cost of operating indicated by the Commensurate
Rent Increase formula.108 Legal methods of raising rents beyond
those levels set by the Rent Guidelines Board include a 20%
vacancy allowance,109 a vacant apartment renovation passthrough,110 and a pass-through for building-wide major capital
improvements (“MCIs”).111 Tenants have a remedy to rent
overcharges, both in the form of illegal rent increases and illegal

106

Lobbia, supra note 99, at 26.
Id. (reporting that “landlords’ actual costs are often less than the prices
vendors quote to RGB researchers” as well as on the effects of temporary fuel
spikes); INCOME AND EXPENSE STUDY, supra note 58, at 5 (stating that,
according to audit results, reports by landlords are generally exaggerated by
8%).
108
According to a 1997 report, the Rent Guidelines Board had done this
for eighteen of the preceding twenty-two years. RENT DESTABILIZATION
STUDY, supra note 77, at 4-5.
109
N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 26-511(c)(5-a) (McKinney 2001). The fact
that rent collections reported by rent stabilized landlords have increased by
figures greater than that allowed by Rent Guidelines Board allowances
demonstrates that landlords are taking advantage of these additional means of
raising rents. INCOME AND EXPENSE STUDY, supra note 58, at 4.
110
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 2522.4(a)(1) (2001). When a
unit is vacant, a landlord does not need any approval to make improvements to
such things as kitchen and bathroom fixtures, doors, and windows and to
increase the base monthly rent for that unit by one-fortieth of the cost of those
improvements. Id.
111
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 2522.4(a)(2)(i) (2001).
Entire apartment complexes can be affected by MCIs. For example, the owner
of Peter Cooper Village on Manhattan’s East Side recently applied for a $44
rent increase for each room of the 2,480 units to pay for rewiring all of the
buildings. Many of the complex’s tenants are long-term elderly residents living
on fixed incomes, for whom a $132 monthly increase (for a one-bedroom
apartment) is a large burden. David Kirby, Tempers Flare over a Rent Rise at
Peter Cooper Village, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2000, § 14, at 8.
107
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initial rents, through a claim filed with DHCR.112 If an
overcharge is found by DHCR in a hearing on the claim, DHCR
will order the landlord to reimburse the tenant for the
overcharged amount plus interest.113 Because of a backlog of
claims at DHCR, however, rent overcharge claims are rarely
addressed before a complaining tenant moves out of the
apartment.114 This results in very few illegal rents being curbed
and contributes to the phenomenon of rising rents in New York
City.115 As a result, almost 48% of New York City tenants spend
more than one-third of their income on rent, and 18% spend
more than half of their income on rent.116 These current realities
are the result of New York City’s narrow conception of rent
regulation. Particularly of late, New York City’s rent regulation
112

N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, §§ 2522.1, 2526.1 (2001).
Section 2526.1 states the following:
Any owner who is found by the DHCR, after a reasonable
opportunity to be heard, to have collected any rent or other
consideration in excess of the legal regulated rent shall be ordered to
pay to the tenant a penalty equal to three times the amount of such
excess, except as provided under subdivision (f) of this section . . . .
If the owner establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that the
overcharge was not willful, the DHCR shall establish the penalty as
the amount of the overcharge plus interest.
§ 2526.1(a)(1).
113
Id.
114
Zucker, supra note 67, at 121 n.28.
115
Id.
116
Lobbia, supra note 99, at 26. See also INCOME AND AFFORDABILITY
STUDY, supra note 98, at 5. These numbers are likely to be exacerbated by the
World Trade Center disaster, which has had strong unemployment effects on
low-wage workers. A report by the Fiscal Policy Institute states that an
estimated 60% of the 79,700 workers who were laid off as a result of the
disaster had an average hourly wage of only $11.00 ($22,880 annual income).
The five occupations most impacted by layoffs were waiters/waitresses,
janitors/cleaners, retail workers, food preparation workers, and cashiers.
FISCAL POLICY INSTITUTE, WORLD TRADE CENTER JOB IMPACTS TAKE A
HEAVY TOLL ON LOW-WAGE WORKERS: OCCUPATIONAL AND WAGE
IMPLICATIONS OF JOB LOSSES RELATED TO THE SEPTEMBER 11 WORLD TRADE
CENTER ATTACK 2, tbl.3, available at http://www.fiscalpolicy.org/Nov
5WTCreport.PDF (Nov. 5, 2001).
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scheme has been pared down to the bare minimum required by
the two theories that have been most strongly advanced
throughout the city’s history with rent regulation—the fair market
objective117 and the preservation of a tenant’s personhood
interest.118
New York’s history with rent control and rent stabilization
demonstrates that the legislature’s objective, arguably, has
always been to prevent unfair profiteering by owners at times
when the market makes that profiteering possible.119 The rent
control program began during the housing shortage of the World
War II era, caused by a shift in production away from housing
and toward materials needed for the war.120 When rent
stabilization was introduced in the 1960s, it protected some of the
best and newest of New York’s housing rather than limiting itself
to low-income housing, the supply of which had already been
increased by the construction of public housing.121
Both rent control and rent stabilization are still subject to
discontinuance today in the event that the citywide vacancy rate
exceeds 5%.122 And the current Rent Stabilization Law still
claims prevention of profiteering as one of its primary purposes:
The council hereby finds that a serious public emergency
continues to exist in the housing of a considerable number
of persons within the city of New York . . .; that such
emergency necessitated the intervention of federal, state
and local government in order to prevent speculative,
unwarranted and abnormal increases in rents; that there
continues to exist an acute shortage of dwellings which
creates a special hardship to persons and families
occupying rental housing; . . . that such action is
117

See infra notes 119-26 and accompanying text (defining the fair market
objective).
118
See infra notes 127-41 and accompanying text (defining the
personhood interest).
119
See Collins, supra note 47.
120
Id. at 1312.
121
Id. at 1313.
122
N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW §§ 26-414, 8623(b) (McKinney 2001), cited in
Collins, supra note 47, at 1314.

DICKMACRO4-29.DOC

REGULATING ROOMMATE RELATIONS

7/16/02 2:28 PM

565

necessary to prevent the exactions of unjust, unreasonable
and oppressive rents and rental agreements and to
forestall profiteering, speculation and other disruptive
practices tending to produce threats to the public health,
safety and general welfare.123
One commentator calls this the “fair rent objective” and finds
that it also explains recent amendments to the Rent Stabilization
Law.124 Today in New York City, rents are high and the vacancy
rate is low, making those apartments that are affordable to lowincome tenants even more scarce than the vacancy rate of 3.19%
suggests.125 Thus, in order to protect low-income tenants against
exorbitant rents, those tenants should be allowed to take in
roommates as they need them.126
A second justification for rent regulation that is relevant in
the context of New York’s regulatory history is the
“personhood” interest that a tenant holds in her home.127
123

N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 26-501 (McKinney 2001) (emphasis added).
Collins, supra note 47, at 1300. This explains why in 1993 a luxury
decontrol amendment was designed to take out of regulation those tenants
earning greater than $250,000 annual income while at the same time paying
greater than $2000 in monthly rent. There is a scarcity of low-rent apartments
available for less than $2000 per month, and for this reason, Collins explains,
the legislature did not decontrol them even when occupied by rich tenants
earning greater than $250,000 annually. Id. at 1317-19. However, this
example demonstrates that a fair rent objective alone cannot explain the
amendment because its effects were purposely limited to high-income tenants.
Moderate-income tenants paying greater than $2000 per month did not have
their units deregulated. A separate justification must have played a role is this
limitation—either redistribution of wealth or the recognition that affordable
rents are needed to preserve the tenure rights of low-income tenants but not
high-income tenants. See Zucker, supra note 67, at 135-37 (noting the
relationship between rent levels and tenure).
125
See infra note 147 (citing the vacancy rates for lower-rent apartments).
126
The Rent Guidelines Board explained the 5.5% increase in average
building rent collections for rent stabilized buildings in 1999 as “most likely
propelled by fewer vacancies and strong rent collections as demand for rental
housing continued to outstrip supply.” INCOME AND EXPENSE STUDY, supra
note 58, at 9.
127
Radin, supra note 47, at 414. The findings behind the Emergency
Price Control Act of 1942 expressed the purpose of preventing the “uprooting
124
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Proponents of this view argue that a person’s interest in her home
“is morally entitled to more weight than purely commercial
landlording” because a person’s “individuality and selfhood
become intertwined” with her home.128 Control over resources in
the external environment, such as an apartment or house, gives a
person an important sense of achievement and well-being.129 The
U.S. Constitution affirms the special importance of the home by
making it the locus of the right to privacy.130 Under this
reasoning, taking in a roommate differs drastically from
subletting because the tenant not only has a personal relationship
with her roommate, as noted by the appellate division in
Roughton-Hester, but maintains a personal relationship to her
home. 131 A subletting tenant’s personhood interest in her home
fades as she takes a new home for up to two years and her
apartment approaches “fungible property,” defined as property
“held merely instrumentally or for investment and exchange.”132
The aspect of the New York rent regulation system that most
directly reflects an interest in the personhood justification is the
tenant’s tenure rights.133 Tenure rights, in relation to housing,
derive from the recognition that as tenants become long-term
occupants of their homes, they develop “a right not to be
[of] long-time city residents from their communities.” Emergency Price
Control Act, 1942 N.Y. Laws 460, § 1, cited in Collins, supra note 47, at
1314.
128
Radin, supra note 47, at 414-15.
129
Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, in PERSPECTIVES ON
PROPERTY LAW 8, 8 (Robert C. Ellison et al. eds., 2d ed. 1995).
130
Id. at 17.
131
520 East 81st St. Assocs. v. Roughton-Hester, 555 N.Y.S.2d 70, 73
(App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1990) (reasoning that “[m]any roommates are not
strangers, but individuals who choose to live together, apportioning the costs
according to their respective financial abilities, and other considerations”).
132
Radin, supra note 47, at 415.
133
“Tenure” is defined as “[a] right, term or mode of holding lands or
tenements in subordination to a superior.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1481
(Bryan Garner ed., 7th ed. 1999). A residential tenant’s right to tenure is the
“tenant’s presumptive right to continue in possession” of her home. Paul
Sullivan, Security of Tenure for the Residential Tenant: An Analysis and
Recommendations, 21 VT. L. REV. 1015, 1015 (1997).
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uprooted, a right to call their place of residence a home with
some of the same sense of permanence with which a homeowner
uses the term.”134 The most important tenure right is the
requirement that a landlord have a just cause for eviction.135
Eviction control, however, is not the only regulation necessary to
ensure tenure rights because there is always a level at which a
tenant’s rising rent will force her to move.136
The New York State Assembly seems to have focused on the
personhood interest as its principal justification for regulating
landlord-tenant relations in its recent enactments, but has done so
in a way that neglects the effects of rent levels on tenure.137 For
example, the Rent Regulation Reform Act of 1997, the most
recent set of amendments to the Rent Stabilization Law, codified
the more liberal definition of family eligible for succession rights
that was part of the Rent Stabilization Code.138 Under this act, a
tenant’s ability to pass on her home to her family is fortified. At
the same time, however, the act limits a succeeding tenant’s right
to the regulated rent level to only the first succeeding family
member.139 Any subsequent succeeding family members can be
charged the vacancy bonus.140 Thus, the legislature has focused
on longevity over affordability. In this same act, the only other
provision that could be characterized as pro-tenant is a new
protection for tenants against certain types of landlord harassment
intended to cause a tenant to vacate her apartment illegally.141
134

Zucker, supra note 67, at 127-28 (arguing for a system in which
landlords would have to pay their tenants “insurance” for the loss of their
tenure rights if they were to evict their tenants without cause).
135
Id. at 128.
136
See id. at 137. Limits on rent increases also reflect the goal of
protecting personhood interests by allowing tenants to plan for predictable rent
increases so that they are not forced out by them. Id. at 128.
137
See infra notes 138-45 and accompanying text.
138
See supra note 66 (outlining the statutory definition).
139
Rent Regulation Reform Act, 1997 N.Y. Laws 116, § 22.
140
Id.; see also supra note 60 (describing the 20% vacancy allowance).
141
Rent Regulation Reform Act, 1997 N.Y. Laws 116, § 28.
An owner is guilty of harassment of a rent regulated tenant when with
intent to cause a rent regulated tenant to vacate a housing
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Thus, the legislature again has demonstrated its concern for
insuring the personhood interests of existing tenants.
In his memorandum in support of the Rent Regulation Reform
Act of 1997, Governor George Pataki voiced the prediction that
“3 of every 4 apartments are expected to reach market levels as a
result of the far-reaching reforms included in the bill,” including
the vacancy bonus of 20%, supplemental vacancy bonuses, and
luxury decontrol.142 To anyone cognizant of the effects of rent
levels on a tenant’s ability to find adequate housing and of a
tenant’s periodic need to move,143 it is surprising to read the
governor’s repeated assertions in the same memorandum that
“the bill continues to protect more than 99 percent of all
currently regulated tenants and their families.”144 The governor’s
concern is evidently focused upon a tenant’s interest in her
established home, not upon the existence of adequate choices for
a tenant in her housing search.145 This narrow focus has clearly
contributed to the lack of affordable units in New York City.

accommodation, such owner: 1. With intent to cause physical injury
to such tenant, causes such injury to such tenant or to a third person;
or 2. Recklessly causes physical injury to such tenant or to a third
person.
Id.
142

GOVERNOR’S PROGRAM BILL MEMORANDUM #72, A.8346, Ch. 116
(New York State Legislative Annual 1997), at 74.
143
Kim Phillips-Fein, Housing: The Hidden Issue, AM. PROSPECT, Dec.
4, 2000, at 26. Between 1993 and 1996, 35% of New York City’s rent
regulated apartments turned over at least once. Id. See also Sullivan, supra
note 133, at 1070.
144
GOVERNOR’S PROGRAM BILL MEMORANDUM #72, supra note 142, at
77.
145
See Shaila K. Dewan, Deregulation by Landlords Is Increasing, Study
Says, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2002, § 1, at 37 (quoting one of the study’s
authors as saying that “[t]he ability of anyone moving within the city or to the
city to find a rent-regulated apartment is gone”). See also Zucker, supra note
67, at 130 (“[H]ome is a place to establish identity. Identity requires change as
much as continuity . . . . The goal should be to nurture identity by enlarging
tenant choice.”).
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2. Disparate Impact of Eviction
A low-income tenant who is evicted from her apartment loses
more than a middle- or upper-income tenant who is evicted.146
That tenant’s search for a new apartment will be much more
difficult because of a greater scarcity of apartments that lowincome tenants can afford.147 In fact, homelessness is a dangerous
repercussion of evicting low-income tenants.148 Studies show that
27.5% to 60% of homeless families became homeless as a result
of eviction.149 From another viewpoint, among those tenants
supported by public assistance who are evicted from their
apartments, an estimated one-quarter will become homeless.150
Commentators on rent regulation argue that a low-income
tenant loses more when she is evicted, even when that eviction
does not lead to homelessness, because low-income tenants invest
more “psychic equity” into their apartments.151 “Psychic equity”
has been defined as something that is derived “from the effort,
attachment, and commitment required to turn one’s house or
146

See Karas, supra note 94, at 527.
In 1999, the vacancy rate for apartments renting under $400 per month
was 1.26%, rising slightly to 2.53% for apartments renting at $400-$499, and
to 2.86% for apartments renting at $500-$599 per month. INCOME AND
AFFORDABILITY STUDY, supra note 98, at 4.
148
Karas, supra note 94, at 532.
149
Id.
150
Id. The repercussions of homelessness are harsh. For example, those
who are homeless are more susceptible to illness (including such chronic
diseases as hypertension, diabetes, traumatic disorders, and respiratory
ailments). Id. at 532-34. A person is more likely to suffer from mental
disorders as a result of homelessness (including dementia, severe depression,
and substance addiction). Id. at 532-33. Homelessness takes its toll on a
person’s ability to find a job, raise her family, build friendships, and
participate in elections. Id. at 545-46. It increases a person’s likelihood of
family separation, institutionalization, and imprisonment. Id. (arguing that
indigent tenants have a right to counsel in New York eviction cases in part
because of the harsh results of eviction for so many tenants).
151
Zucker, supra note 67, at 134; see also EDGAR O. OLSEN, THE
IMPACT OF VACANCY DECONTROL IN NEW YORK CITY: THE FIRST ESTIMATES
FROM THE 1996 HOUSING AND VACANCY SURVEY 19, available at http://
www.housingnyc.com/research/html_reports/olsen.html (Nov. 1997).
147
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apartment into a home.”152 Because their choices are limited,
low-income tenants invest more psychic equity into making an
apartment a home.153 This argument holds true for tangible
investments as well. Rent stabilized tenants generally spend more
time and money on both acquiring their apartments and on
maintaining their apartments, since rent stabilized landlords are
less likely to provide needed repairs.154 These arguments
elucidate the concept of the “personhood” interest discussed
above.155
The fact that a tenant has taken in a roommate does not
devalue those arguments. A tenant who takes in a roommate does
not lose her personhood interest in the apartment even by
charging her roommate a rent greater than the entire rent. A
tenant’s personhood interest derives from the importance of her
home to her sense of self.156 While the investment value of her
apartment increases, its personal value does not consequentially
decrease.157 Psychic equity may in fact be increased by the taking
in of a roommate in that the process of finding an acceptable
roommate to help pay the rent is a considerable investment.158
3. Informal Exchange
Tenants who take in roommates frequently offer something in
exchange for a higher portion of the rent such as furnishings,
utilities, food, chores, childcare, freedom from paying a security

152

Zucker, supra note 67, at 134.
Id. at 135-36.
154
Olsen, supra note 151, at 19. See also 1999 HOUSING AND VACANCY
SURVEY, TABLE: NUMBER OF 1999 MAINTENANCE DEFICIENCIES, RENTOCCUPIED HOUSING UNITS, available at http://www.housingnyc.com (last
visited Mar. 23, 2002) (reporting U.S. Census research that 56.5% of
unregulated units were free from deficiencies, while only 40% of stabilized
units were).
155
See Radin, supra note 47, at 414-15. See supra notes 127-32 and
accompanying text (defining the personhood interest).
156
Radin, supra note 47, at 414-15.
157
See generally id.
158
Zucker, supra note 67, at 134.
153
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deposit, and freedom from committing to a long-term lease.159
When the rent paid by a tenant is not actually disproportionate,
there is obviously no wrong warranting interference. A study
conducted in three low-income neighborhoods in Chicago in the
1980s suggests that this sort of in-kind exchange is more common
among low-income tenants.160 It may also be more common
between those who have social or familial ties, and in situations
where the primary tenant is a senior citizen.161 Despite the fact
that an in-kind exchange can make a roommate arrangement that
is actually proportionate appear disproportionate, the strict
language of the proportionality provision does not exempt these
roommate arrangements from its restriction.162 In fact, the
proportionality provision does not even allow for a greater share
of the rent to be paid by a roommate who occupies a greater
number of the rooms.163
4. Lack of Representation
While landlords are represented by counsel in approximately
80% to 90% of summary eviction proceedings, tenants are
represented in only 10% to 15% of such proceedings.164 The
159

See UNDER ONE ROOF, supra note 88, at 10; Burger Affidavit, supra
note 93.
160
UNDER ONE ROOF, supra note 88, at 17.
161
Id. at 10; George C. Hemmens & Charles J. Hoch, Shared Housing in
Low Income Households, in UNDER ONE ROOF, supra note 88, at 17; Jay
Romano, Rent Rules: Codification or Stretch?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2002, §
11, at 5 [hereinafter Rent Rules].
162
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 2525.7 (2001) (“For the
purposes of this subdivision, an occupant’s proportionate share shall be
determined by dividing the legal regulated rent by the total number of tenants
named on the lease and the total number of occupants residing in the subject
housing accommodation.”).
163
Id. § 2525.7. See also Romano, supra note 42, § 11, at 5.
164
144 Woodruff Corp. v. Lacrete, 585 N.Y.S.2d 956, 958 (Civ. Ct.
1992). See also Russell Engler, Out of Sight and Out of Line: The Need for
Regulation of Lawyers’ Negotiations with Unrepresented Poor Persons, 85
CALIF. L. REV. 79 (1997) (describing the repercussions of that imbalance for
legal negotiations and calling for the more ethical treatment of unrepresented
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overwhelming majority of unrepresented tenants are poor, and
many are people of color.165 Moreover, the presence or absence
of representation profoundly affects the outcome of legal
proceedings.166 Lack of representation is likely to have a
particularly strong effect in cases concerning the proportionality
provision because the interpretation of this provision is still open
for argument.167 For example, the housing court in Mazzola
interpreted the provision in relation to the concept of
profiteering, holding that a tenant is subject to eviction without
the opportunity to cure when that tenant charges her roommate a
rent greater than the entire unit rent.168 The decision, however,
does not stipulate the results for tenants who charge their
roommates greater than a “proportionate” amount but less than
the entire rent.169 Moreover, DHCR’s own general counsel
disagrees with the court’s interpretation of the remedies provided
by the provision, calling reliance on the Mazzola court’s decision

tenants in housing court where pressured negotiations between landlords’
lawyers and tenants are the norm).
165
Lacrete, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 958. One study found that only 17.3% of
black tenants and 18.6% of Hispanic tenants were represented by lawyers
whereas 32.7% of white tenants were. Female tenants were represented
slightly less often than male tenants. Engler, supra note 164, at 108 n.130.
166
Carol Seron et al., The Impact of Legal Counsel on Outcomes for Poor
Tenants in New York City’s Housing Court: Results of a Randomized
Experiment, 35 L. & SOC’Y REV. 419 (2001). This recent study, comparing a
treatment group to a control group, found drastic differences even though only
56% of the treatment group was given legal representation (compared to 4%
of the control group). Of the treatment group, 32% had judgments entered
against them, compared to 52% of the control group; 24% had warrants of
eviction entered against them, compared to 44% of the control group; and
19% were able to stipulate for a rent abatement due to repair problems,
compared to 3% of the control group. Id. at 427.
167
See Karas, supra note 94, at 549-50 (“Without mastering the relevant
statutory provisions or case law, no tenant can conceivably hope to raise an
effective defense against eviction.”).
168
RAM I LLC v. Mazzola, N.Y.L.J., June 8, 2001, at 21:1 (Civ. Ct.),
aff’d & remanded, No. 01-294, 2001 WL 1682829 (Sup. App. Term. 1st
Dep’t Dec. 28, 2001).
169
Id.
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to create a cause for eviction “misplaced.”170 Thus, there is room
for argument, but these arguments will only be successfully made
by tenants who are represented by counsel.171
170

Hirsch Affidavit, supra note 36, at ¶ 282. See also supra note 36
(quoting DHCR’s interpretation of the provision as providing a claim to the
overcharged roommate).
171
See infra notes 177-81 and accompanying text (detailing Baltimore
housing court study). Another legal issue that has yet to be resolved in the
court’s treatment of the provision as grounds for eviction is the tenant’s
accountability to the landlord for her actions. One landlord’s attorney wrote
the following to his client’s tenant:
[You] are herewith demanded to . . . forthwith account to this office
for any and all sums collected by you from your roommates or other
persons who have occupied the apartment in the last two years.
Unless I receive this information by close of business on February 6,
2001, Landlord will move to terminate your tenancy based on
wrongful conduct and seek your eviction from the Subject Premises.
Exhibit A, Affidavit of Sara Jane Swanson in Support of Petition, Brooklyn
Hous. & Family Services v. N.Y. State Div. of Hous. and Cmty. Renewal,
No. 14191/01 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings County 2001). See also Rent Rules, supra
note 161, § 11, at 5 (quoting one tenant activist as fearing that the provision
“allows the landlord to pry into [tenants’] personal finances” even before
bringing an eviction action). The decision in Mazzola left open the question of
whether landlords have the right to order their tenants to report their
roommate arrangements upon demand or face eviction. It also left open the
question of whether this reporting requirement can be written into a lease and
whether such reports could be treated as admissions if they were to reveal
disproportionalities of rents.
Such an interpretation would remove a large burden from the landlord in
proving that a tenant is subject to eviction under the proportionality provision
because a landlord would find it easy to gather the facts needed to commence
an eviction. See N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. § 741[4] (McKinney 2001)
(requiring that every petition to recover real property “[s]tate the facts upon
which the special proceeding is based”); Gianni v. Stuart, 178 N.Y.S.2d 709,
711 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1958) (“A tenant is entitled to a concise statement of
the ultimate facts upon which the proceeding is predicated so that the issues, if
any there be, are properly raised and can be met.”); City of New York v.
Torres, 631 N.Y.S.2d 208, 209 (App. Term 1st Dep’t 1995) (finding that
facts were insufficient for an eviction action where landlord stated only that
the building was “in a condition which endangers the life, health or safety of
the occupants,” rather than alleging specific dangerous conditions). An
interpretation of the provision as allowing landlords to demand information on
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Access to pre-litigation information is equally disparate. Fifty
percent of rent stabilized tenants do not even know that their
units are regulated, information that is necessary to even begin
understanding the applicable laws.172 DHCR has made no effort
to inform tenants and tenant advocates of the implications of the
proportionality provision; it has not published any operational
bulletin or other written explanation to inform the public of the
proportionality provision’s relevance and application.173 Because
tenants can conceal rent-sharing arrangements by paying with one
check, this disparity of access to information becomes especially
important.174 Informed tenants will know not to pay with two
checks that disclose the amount of rent paid by each party.
Furthermore, compliance also requires a certain level of
education and proficiency in the English language.175 Proper
calculation of the proportionality formula requires a close reading
of the statutory language and some mathematical ability.176
A study of the Baltimore housing court found that the failure
of tenants to successfully defend their cases was due in large part

their tenants’ roommate arrangements would also create disparate treatment
between those tenants who know of the proportionality provision and have
made the decision to lie to their landlords about their roommate arrangements,
and those who do not. See generally Rent Rules, supra note 161.
172
Olsen, supra note 151, at 18-19 (attributing this ignorance, in part, to
the misperception that high regulated rents engender).
173
Telephone Interview with Helpline Personnel, DHCR Rent Helpline
(on Oct. 18, 2001). The staff at the Rent Helpline informed the author that the
only written explanation of the roommate proportionality provision was the
code itself. Id.
174
See supra note 70 (citing the statutory basis for paying with one
check).
175
See Zucker, supra note 67, at 144 (“Given that illiteracy among the
poor runs around three times higher than the level for the general population,
understanding the fine-print legalese of the existing lease may not be possible
for many.”); Karas, supra note 94, at 534-35.
176
See supra note 9 and accompanying text (citing the statutory language
of the proportionality provision). See also Karas, supra note 94, at 548-50;
Seron, supra note 166, at 431 (surmising that the calculation of rent owed is
one of the important functions that a tenant’s lawyer plays in their
representation).
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to their inability to be accommodated by the culture of the
court.177 Poor tenants are more likely to understand the world in a
relational way, taking into account the entire history of relations
between people, which contrasts with a rule-oriented perspective
applied by the courts.178 To these tenants, “rules are a series of
‘they say,’ the power of which is felt in the paucity of relief to be
had from the law’s abstractions and categories, made by people
authorized to say what the law is.”179 Thus, tenants have
difficulty translating rules and laws into their rights.180 Even
when informed of their rights, unrepresented tenants in this study
remained silent about their rights when standing before a
judge.181
Despite the familiar adage that ignorance of the law is no
excuse, the courts have traditionally been sympathetic to ignorant
and unrepresented parties when disparate representation has led
to disparate results.182 For example, a tenant’s ignorance of the
law can constitute good cause for vacating a stipulation when a
tenant has unknowingly waived valid defenses to an eviction
proceeding.183 The New York housing courts routinely set aside
stipulations for this reason.184 One court stated, “Although
stipulations are highly regarded by the courts and not lightly cast
177

Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court: Participation and Subordination
of Poor Tenants’ Voices in Legal Process, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 533 (1992).
178
Id. at 586-87.
179
Id. at 591.
180
Id.
181
Id. at 561, 591.
182
Zucker, supra note 67, at 145 n.85 (“[O]ne of the fundamental
justifications for government intervention is to reduce the costs and extent of
asymmetric information.”).
183
In re Estate of Frutiger, 272 N.E.2d 543 (N.Y. 1971) (setting forth a
“good cause” standard).
184
See, e.g., Dearie v. Hunter, 676 N.Y.S.2d 896 (Civ. Ct. 1998)
(where pro se tenant had waived defenses under the Spiegel Act and the Fair
Rent Collection Practices Act); 144 Woodruff Corp. v. Lacrete, 585 N.Y.S.2d
956 (Civ. Ct. 1992) (where pro se tenant had agreed to pay rent in excess of
the legal regulated amount); Sicherman/Pomp v. Jenkins, 567 N.Y.S.2d 566
(Civ. Ct. 1989) (where pro se tenant had waived the defense of warranty of
habitability and improper rent amount).
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aside, the court may do so in appropriate cases upon a showing
of good cause. This is especially true where, as here, there is an
unsophisticated tenant not represented by counsel and completely
unaware of defenses available to them [sic].”185
Additionally, ethical rules prevent parties from taking
advantage of unrepresented persons by limiting communications
between an attorney and an unrepresented person whose interests
are contrary to the interests of the attorney’s client.186 Advicegiving, for example, is prohibited.187 If an unrepresented party
perceives a statement made by the other party’s lawyer to be
advice, that statement is unethical regardless of whether it was
intended as advice.188 Thus, the rules of ethics recognize the
potential for misunderstandings by unrepresented parties and
defer to their interpretation of the lawyer’s statements in order to
best protect them.
Based on this argument, a tenant should not necessarily be
excused from complying with regulations simply because she is
ignorant of them, but where possible, regulations should seek to
avoid disparate impacts on those who are unrepresented. For
example, in constructing a roommate protection, it may not be
enough to provide tenants with an affirmative defense when their
overcharge is justified.189 Tenants might not benefit from, for
185

Dearie, 676 N.Y.S.2d at 897 (citation omitted).
New York Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-104(A)(2), cited
in Engler, supra note 164, at 85, 101. Disciplinary bodies in New York have
the authority to impose sanctions including reprimand, referral to the court
with a recommendation for censure, suspension, or disbarment. N.Y. COMP.
CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 605.14(a)(4) (1990), cited in Engler, supra note
164, at 133 n.254. Unfortunately, Engler argues, the existing rules are
frequently violated in part because the reporting responsibility does not lie
with an independent body, but with clients and colleagues who have no
incentive to file complaints against lawyers who mistreat unrepresented
tenants. Engler, supra note 164, at 133-34.
187
New York Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-104(A)(2), cited
in Engler, supra note 164, at 85.
188
Engler, supra note 164, at 99.
189
See Bezdek, supra note 177, at 561 (observing that whether a tenant
held a legal defense and was cognizant of it was not the determining factor in
her success in housing court).
186
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example, an allowance for sharing the rent burden among family
members, or an exemption in the case of economic hardship,
because the majority of tenants will not be successful in arguing
such defenses in court.190 Likewise, tenants should be given the
opportunity to cure their errors without the grave repercussion of
losing their homes. The proportionality provision, in contrast,
has been read to provide an incurable basis for eviction, giving
an unrepresented tenant no chance to pay back an overcharge
before she is evicted.191
III. A PROPER SOLUTION
Both DHCR and the Mazzola court have erred in their design
of a roommate overcharge provision, but the question remains
whether one should exist at all. As set forth in Roughton-Hester,
the tenant-roommate relationship is often a personal one and,
arguably, should not be regulated.192 However, examining the
tenant-roommate relationship from the perspective of several rent
regulation theories demonstrates that some protection of
roommates from overcharge is warranted.193 In some respects,
the primary tenant’s access to the coveted commodity of housing
in a tight housing market warrants treatment somewhat similar to
the treatment given landlords. Under the reasoning of the fair
market objective, it is clear that a tenant who takes advantage of
the housing shortage to charge a roommate exorbitant rents can
be prevented from doing so under the same justification that
prevents a landlord from doing so.194 Indeed, this reasoning was
190

See generally Bezdek, supra note 177; Seron, supra note 166.
RAM I LLC v. Mazzola, N.Y.L.J., June 8, 2001, at 21:1 (Civ. Ct.),
aff’d & remanded, No. 01-294, 2001 WL 1682829 (Sup. App. Term. 1st
Dep’t Dec. 28, 2001), at *1. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text
(discussing the decision in Mazzola).
192
See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
193
See generally Collins, supra note 47, at 1300; Radin, supra note 47.
194
See Collins, supra note 47, at 1300. However, a counter-argument
under this reasoning might be that shared housing arrangements decrease the
shortage of housing in a way that is relatively inexpensive. UNDER ONE ROOF,
supra note 88, at 11.
191
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used to justify limits on a tenant’s right to overcharge a
sublettor.195 By promulgating a properly designed roommate
overcharge provision, DHCR would therefore act within the Rent
Stabilization Law’s stated purpose “to forestall profiteering,
speculation, and other disruptive practices tending to produce
threats to the public health,”196 and would thus avoid
overstepping its authority.197 As laid out above, however, that
provision needs to take into account the tenant’s economic
needs.198 Moreover, under both the community preservation and
redistribution of wealth theories, it is not clear that a roommate is
less deserving of protection than a primary tenant.199 The
justifications that provide support for a tenant’s overcharging her
roommate, therefore, should have limits.
A. The Exemptions Must Be Limited
A careful analysis of the justifications for rent overcharge can
delineate the limits of those justifications. For example, while a
tenant’s economic need may justify her taking in a roommate at a
disproportionate rent, the purpose of constructing such an
exemption is to allow tenants to afford their escalating rents.200
That justification, therefore, does not apply when a tenant’s rent
from her roommate goes to pay expenses other than rent.201 Rent
from a roommate beyond the level needed to pay the tenant’s rent

195

See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text (analyzing the purposes
behind statutory limitations on subletting).
196
N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 26-501 (McKinney 2001).
197
See supra note 24 and accompanying text (applying the ultra vires
doctrine to the promulgation of the proportionality provision).
198
See supra Part II.B.1.
199
See infra Part III.A.
200
See supra Part II.B.1.
201
See supra note 58 (discussing the governmental takings doctrine). It
may be argued that those expenses should be subsidized as well, many of them
being just as essential to living as housing. That subsidy, however, should not
come from other renters in need of housing or by means of the protection of
rent regulation. See supra note 196 and accompanying text (quoting the Rent
Stabilization Law’s stated purpose).
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is true profiteering. It is difficult to determine that level for every
individual, and such a determination would be prohibitively
cumbersome in a court or administrative proceeding, requiring
formulas akin to those used by welfare agencies and
documentation of all income and any extraordinary expenses.202
One approach would be to set that level at the unit’s entire rent.
The rent that a tenant earns from her roommate above the unit’s
rent, as a rule, does not go toward protecting her housing in an
unfair housing market, and should not be protected by rent
regulation.203
An alternative would be to set that level at the average
welfare assistance payment for a household equal in size to the
tenant’s, on the assumption that the welfare shelter allowance is a
good indicator of the minimum income that a household would be
able to contribute toward rent.204 Thus, the roommate could bring
an overcharge action if she were paying a rent greater than the
entire unit rent minus the shelter allowance for which the tenant
might be eligible.205 There are several problems, however, with
this more conservative formula. First, it is not an accurate
indication of minimum household income because not all tenants
are eligible for welfare; therefore, some of the poorest tenants
might be deprived of their tenancies despite a legitimate
justification.206 Second, the complexity of the formula would
202

See, e.g., BARRY STROM, PUBLIC BENEFITS IN NEW YORK § PA, at
123-206 (1998 ed.) (describing the process of calculating eligibility and
benefits for the Family Assistance and Safety Net Assistance programs over
the course of more than eighty pages).
203
See supra note 196 and accompanying text (quoting the Rent
Stabilization Law’s stated purpose).
204
See Anderson, supra note 104, at 1:2 (reporting the current monthly
shelter allowance for a family of four in Manhattan as $312).
205
See generally N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, §§ 2522.1,
2526.1 (2001) (prescribing the following overcharge action that a tenant may
take against a landlord: “[a]ny owner who is found by DHCR . . . to have
collected any rent or other consideration in excess of the legal regulated rent
shall be ordered to pay the tenant a penalty equal to three times the amount of
such excess”).
206
See STROM, supra note 202, § PA, at 11, 61-106. The 1996 welfare
reforms put into effect a sixty-month lifetime limit on receipt of Family
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cause the same problems discussed above for tenants with less
education and without legal representation.207
The similar statuses of tenants and their roommates also limit
the justifications under which a tenant’s interests should be
protected at any cost. For example, the community preservation
theory supports the protection of long-term tenants and
recognizes their need to take in roommates at disproportionate
rents over time as tenant incomes may decrease with retirement,
and as rents increase.208 Nonetheless, this theory also supports the
protection of roommates. As discussed above, roommates may be
long-term members of the community even if they have not lived
in their units for a long time because of the informal means by
which tenants typically advertise for roommates.209 Likewise, the
redistribution of wealth perspective does not clearly favor the
tenant over her roommate so as to justify limitless
overcharging.210 While statistics on their relative wealth are not
available, there is no reason to believe that people seeking rooms
to rent are generally richer than those who already have
stabilized apartments and are seeking roommates. Thus, a
roommate overcharge protection is warranted to prevent
unjustifiable redistribution of wealth from roommates to
tenants.211
B. Provision Design
Economic need, informal exchange, and ignorance of the law
should all be recognized as justifications for overcharging a
roommate under any code that attempts to regulate roommate
relations, both because these reasons excuse the tenant and
because exemptions based on these reasons prevent disparate

Assistance, id. § PA, at 11, as well as an exclusion of benefits to some groups
of non-citizens, id. § PA, at 61-106.
207
See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
208
Radin, supra note 47, at 417-18.
209
See ZANY’S, supra note 89, at 314-15.
210
Radin, supra note 47, at 412.
211
See Collins, supra note 47, at 1305.
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effects on low-income tenants.212 Those exemptions, however,
are limited by the extent to which the protection of roommates is
also warranted. Thus, as the discussion above has already
demonstrated, designing a roommate overcharge provision to
encompass all of these goals is somewhat difficult.
An important consideration in the remedy must be the
innocence of the roommate.213 The case law around succession
rights, for example, recognizes that “[i]mproprieties committed
by the departed household member . . . cannot defeat the right of
the remaining household member to succeed to the tenancy.”214
Likewise, the roommate is an innocent party when the primary
tenant charges her an excessive rent, and should be treated as
such. Transfer of the tenancy to the roommate who has been
overcharged is one potential remedy that recognizes the
roommate’s innocence.215 A problem with this remedy is that it,
unfortunately, creates an incentive for collusion both at the
expense of the primary tenant and at the expense of the landlord.
The landlord may approach the roommate and encourage her to
disclose the facts of her rental agreement in order to have the
primary tenant evicted and to give the roommate the right to the
tenancy.216 This danger, however, can be mitigated by giving the
tenant an opportunity to cure the overcharge by lowering the
roommate’s rent to an amount equal to or below the entire unit
rent within ten days of receiving notice from the landlord.217 In
212

See supra Part II (explaining how such circumstances justify
exemption).
213
See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text (contrasting the
remedies given sublettors when primary tenants are found to be profiteering at
their expense).
214
I.N. Ovington Corp. v. Surdo, N.Y.L.J., July 8, 1998, at 25:3 (Civ.
Ct.) (assigning the tenancy to an innocent successor despite the primary
tenant’s failure to report that person’s presence and income on her application
for a Senior Citizens Rent Increase Exemption). See also Levine v. Costanzo,
N.Y.L.J., Feb. 17, 1994, at 24:3 (App. Term 1st Dep’t).
215
See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text (citing the use of this
remedy when a subletting tenant is found to have an “illusory tenancy”).
216
See Court OKs Eviction, supra note 69, at 11 (“Once the roommate
learns that the tenant is violating the law, try to get his cooperation.”).
217
See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 2524.3(a) (2001)
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addition, collusion might be discouraged by permitting no
vacancy allowance to be added to the roommate’s new base rent,
thus removing the landlord’s incentive to collude.218
On the other hand, the vacancy allowance is needed to protect
the landlord against collusion between the tenant and roommate.
For example, a tenant who plans to move out of her unit
permanently, but would like to give a friend the opportunity to
have this rent-stabilized unit without competing with others,
might spuriously overcharge that friend and cause her own
eviction. This would provide a means of avoiding the
requirements put in place for succession rights.219 This danger
could be mitigated by limiting the remedy of transferring the
tenancy to the roommate to cases in which the roommate had
lived in the unit for more than one or two years, creating a
veritable succession right for the roommate. Giving the
roommate a right to the tenancy, however, differs in an important
respect from a succession right or the reassignment of the
tenancy to a sublettor where an illusory tenancy is found. It
evicts from her home a tenant who still lives in that home and has
a personhood interest in it.220 For these reasons, the transfer of
the tenancy to the roommate is not the best remedy for a
roommate overcharge.
A roommate overcharge provision should instead provide
roommates with a cause for reimbursement in cases where they
are being charged a rent greater than the entire unit rent.221 In
this way, those tenants who cannot afford even half of their rent

(allowing eviction on the grounds of a violation of a substantial obligation of
the lease only when the tenant has “failed to cure such violation after written
notice of the owner that the violations cease within 10 days”).
218
See supra note 60 and accompanying text (outlining the statutory
vacancy allowance).
219
See supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text (discussing succession
rights).
220
See supra notes 127-32 and accompanying text (defining the
personhood interest).
221
See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, §§ 2522.1, 2526.1
(2001) (providing tenants with a cause of action for reimbursement against
landlords charging illegal initial rents and illegal rent increases).
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will not be penalized for taking in roommates out of economic
need. This also avoids the inevitable disparate repercussions that
an eviction action poses to poor tenants, who are less likely to be
represented and more likely to become homeless upon losing
their tenancy.222 This solution allows tenants who are ignorant of
the regulation at least some opportunity to correct their errors
without losing their homes. Moreover, access to information and
legal representation is likely to be more equal between a tenant
and her roommate than between a landlord and tenant, making
the tenant-roommate dispute more equitable than that between a
landlord and tenant.223 Finally, the informal exchange of
resources in the place of rent should be an affirmative defense to
a roommate overcharge if greater or equal in value to the
overcharge.224 It should be clearly written into the provision so
that tenants and judges are aware of it.225
CONCLUSION
The roommate proportionality provision was enacted with
two debilitating flaws.226 These errors show the true nature of the
provision as a tool for weakening tenant rights in the guise of
expanding protections to roommates.227 As applied by the courts
222

See supra Parts II.B.2, 4.
See supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text (citing a great gap in
representation between landlords and tenants).
224
See supra Part II.B.3.
225
But see supra notes 177-81 and accompanying text (citing Bezdek’s
assertion that tenants do not successfully argue affirmative defenses unless
represented).
226
See supra Part II.A-B (explaining that the remedy must not lie with the
landlord and that there must be exemptions for overcharging when the tenant
is justified in doing so).
227
Court OKs Eviction, supra note 69, at 10. At least some landlords give
no thought to the protection of roommates through the provision. One landlord
newsletter informed its readers of the following options:
Most leases bar tenants from violating the law. So if a tenant
overcharges a roommate in violation of the code, you can also seek
the tenant’s eviction based on breach of the lease. But there’s a
downside to this strategy . . . a court might give the tenant a chance
223
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thus far, the provision places the remedy for an overcharge in the
hands of the landlord rather than the roommate.228 It gives the
landlord a means by which to evict entire units instead of giving
roommates protection against overcharge akin to those that
primary tenants hold.229 Moreover, the misapplication of this
provision prevents roommates from choosing disproportionate
rental arrangements even if more affordable to them, and
prevents unmarried couples from sharing their rent as they see
fit.230 Additionally, the provision sets forth a resolute prohibition
against disproportionate rents that does not allow for needed
exceptions.231 If applied without an opportunity to cure, without
consideration of the desperate economic straights of many New
York City tenants, and without adjustments for informal
exchanges, the provision will unjustly prevent many tenants from
maintaining and affording their homes.232 For these reasons, the
provision cannot stand as written.
The purpose of the Rent Stabilization Law is “to prevent
exactions of unjust, unreasonable, and oppressive rents and rental
agreements and to forestall profiteering, speculation, and other
disruptive practices tending to produce threats to the public
health, safety, and general welfare.”233 While proponents of the
proportionality provision jumped on the term “profiteering” in

to correct the lease violation by returning the overcharge amount and
charging the roommate a lower rent in accordance with the code
requirements. That’s why it’s better to sue to evict the tenant for
violating the code.
Id.
228

RAM 1 LLC v. Mazzola, No. 01-294, 2001 WL 1682829 (Sup. App.
Term. 1st Dep’t Dec. 28, 2001), at *1.
229
See supra note 205 (citing statutory basis for the tenant overcharge
action).
230
See LAMBDA Memo, supra note 63.
231
See supra note 9 and accompanying text (quoting language of
proportionality provision); Part II.B (arguing that some sort of exemptions or
accommodations are needed in cases of economic need, disparate impact,
informal exchange, and lack of representation).
232
See supra Part II.B.
233
N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 26-501 (McKinney 2001).
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order to justify the eviction of a large number of tenants living
with roommates, the scarcity of affordable units today requires
that the statutory language be applied more carefully.234 Because
so many tenants must take in roommates at disproportionate rents
in order to afford their homes, and because the repercussions of
eviction in this market are so harsh, eviction of those tenants is
undoubtedly a “disruptive practice” that would produce a threat
to the public welfare.235
Likewise, leaving roommates with no protection against those
tenants who are truly profiteering by charging them greater than
the unit rent would be inconsistent with the purposes of the Rent
Stabilization Law. By adopting a limited and effective roommate
protection, DHCR would avoid Governor Pataki’s shortsighted
assumption that to protect current tenancies is to protect all
tenants.236 Tenants navigating today’s housing market must
frequently become roommates to existing tenants.237 The
protection of roommates, therefore, insures that all tenants have
adequate choices of affordable rooms and units.
For all of these reasons, the proportionality provision should
be invalidated and roommates should be given the benefit of a
cause of action in overcharge against their primary tenants when
they are being charged rent greater than the entire unit rent and
are not receiving in return additional services of equal or greater
value to that overcharge.

234

See, e.g., supra note 41 and accompanying text (characterizing Ms.
Mazzola’s actions as “profiteering”). See also supra note 147 (describing the
scarcity of affordable units).
235
§ 26-501.
236
See supra notes 142-45 and accompanying text (citing Governor
Pataki’s optimistic assessment of the Rent Regulation Reform Act of 1997).
237
See supra note 59 (citing high rates of apartment sharing).

